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I .  INTRODUCTION 
On June 18, 2008, PIaintiffJAppellant, Ray Harrison ("Mr. Harrison") filed his 
Opening Brief on Appeal against the DefendantsIAppellees, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, Inc. ("SARMC") and D. Lee Binnion, M.D. ("Dr. Binnion"), arguing that the district 
court erred in denying Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend the complaint to assert a claim 
against SARMC for negligence in the credentialing and privileging of Dr. Jeffrey Hartford ("Dr. 
Hartford"), that the district court erred in granting the Motion for Protective Order regarding the 
discovery of the exhibits to the Idaho Board of Medicine's disciplinary hearing regarding Dr. 
Hartford's medical license and prohibiting Mr. Harrison from obtaining those exhibits to the 
extent they included information regarding Dr. Hartford's substance abuse treatment; and that 
the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Dr. Binnion. On August 13, 2008, 
SARMC and Dr. Binnion filed Respondents' Briefs asserting that the district court properly 
determined that Idaho Code 5 39-1392c provides immunity from any liabifity for claims of 
negligence in the credentialing and privileging of physicians, that the Court should decline to 
hear the issue regarding the Board of Medicine exhibits, and that the district court properly 
granted summary judgment to Dr. Binnion. Mr. Harrison now submits this Reply Brief on 
Appeal and respectllly requests that the Court reverse the district court's decisions finding 
immunity for claims of negligent credentialing, prohibiting Mr. Harrison from obtaining the 
exhibits used in the Board of Medicine disciplinary proceeding, and granting summary judgment 
to Dr. Binnion. 
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11. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Harrison's Motion for Leave 
to File First Amended Complaint to Assert a Cause of Action for 
Negligence in the Credentialing and Privileging of Dr.   art ford' 
1. - Idaho Code 6 39-1392c does not urovide immunitv fLom neglinent 
credentialin2 claims. 
In response to Mr. Harrison's opening brief, SARMC asserts that the question to 
be resolved on appeal is what is intended by the word "use" in Idaho Code $ 39-1392c. Mr. 
Harrison certainly agrees that this is the ultimate question before the Court, hut disagrees with 
SARMC's conclusion regarding the legislature's intent for the immunity provisions of that 
statute. SARMC asserts, in agreement with the District Court below, that the statute 
unambiguously abrogates any cause of action for negligence in the credentialing and privileging 
of a physician because the statute provides civil immunity for the "use" of peer review 
information. SARMC concludes that if a hospital uses peer review information in making a 
decision regarding the credentialing and privileging of a physician, then Idaho Code $ 39-1392c 
provides full immunity for that decision. 
The first problem with SARMC's argument is that it focuses on the word "use" to 
the exclusion of the rest ofthe statute. In interpreting a statute, the Court's primary function is to 
' In its Statement of Facts, SARMC includes a reference to a suit brought by the Harrisons against Dr. W o r d ' s  
insurance company wherein the Harrisons argued that Dr. Hartford was not drinking at the time he treated Mr. 
Harrison and also states that there is no evidence of a history of substandard care by Dr. Hartford due to his alcohol 
abuse. First, the issue of whether Dr. Hartford was drinking at the time he treated Mr. Harrison is irrelevant to the 
question of whether Idaho Code 5 39-1392c provides absolute immunity for claims of negligence in the 
credentialiig and privileging of physicians. Mr. Harrison's claim is based on whether or not SARMC was negligent 
when the credentialiig occurred in 2001 and the recredentialing was granted in 2003 based on his history of alcohol 
and substance abuse. Secondly, to argue that because Dr. Hartford had not caused harm prior to the treatment of 
Ray Harrison there was no basis for denying his credentials is to argue that a person arrested for DUI on multiple 
occasions should not lose their license to drive until they actually cause serious harm to another person. 
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determine and give effect to legislative intent. Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 266, 92 P.3d 
514, 5 16 (2004). Such intent should be derived from reading the whole act. George W. Watkins 
Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537,539-40,797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990) (emphasis added), 
In this case, the literal words of the statute, as well as the intent derived from the whole Act, 
simply do not support an interpretation that abrogates an entire cause of action for negligent 
credentialing. Mr. Harrison is not seeking to hold SARMC liable for furnishing, receiving, or 
using any particular information in their credentialing process. Rather, Mr. Harrison is seeking 
to hold SARMC liable for negligence for its decision to grant hospital privileges to Dr. Hartford. 
SARMC asserts that to exclude decision making from the word "use" in the 
statute would create a result whereby SARMC would be exempted from liability for receiving 
and reviewing information but not from basing a decision on that information. Mr. Harrison 
respectfully asserts that this is exactly what the legislature intended. The Idaho Peer Review Act 
was first enacted in 1973 and included the grants of immunity for the furnishing of information 
or provision of opinions as well as the receiving and use of such information and opinions that 
currently exist in Idaho Code $39-1392c. The Statement of Purpose which accompanied House 
Bill 136 stated, in part, "[The bill] would also encourage the free exchange of information in 
such proceedings by granting civil immunity to persons providing information or opinions to 
such review and study committees." Statement of Purpose for 1-1.8. 136 (1973). The purpose of 
the bill was to protect medical committees during their discussions and critiques of treatment 
decisions and patient care in the hospital. The legislature wanted these committees to be able to 
freely discuss what might have gone wrong, what: could be improved, and how to prevent 
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mistakes or other problems without fear that such discussions could be used in a later lawsuit or 
submit the medical committee members to charges of slander or defamation for criticizing their 
fellow physicians. That is the context in which the immunity provisions were developed and for 
which they were intended. 
Had the Legislature intended the word "use" to include all decisions made upon 
review and receipt of peer review information and opinions, then it would have, effectively, 
eliminated many, if not all, medical malpractice claims in the state. A doctor facing a 
malpractice claim could state that his treatment decision was made "using" information obtained 
during the course of a peer review committee proceeding and receive full immunity from the 
claim. This is clearly not what the Legislature intended in 1973 and there is nothing to suggest it 
was what was intended when the Legislature amended the Idaho Peer Review Act in 2003 to 
include credentialing and privileging activities as "peer review activities." 
Additionally, the broad interpretation of the word "use" urged by SARMC and 
adopted by the District Court is in direct conflict with other provisions of the Idaho Peer Review 
Act. Specifically, Idaho Code 5 39-1392e(f) provides that if a physician "makes claim or brings 
suit" on account of any investigation or "act" by the health care organization, the physician is 
deemed to have waived any claim for privilege of such peer review activities and the health care 
organization can release such information and use it in its own defense. Clearly then, the 
Legislature contemplated that a health care organization might face suit from a physician for 
decisions made in the course of peer review activities, including privileging and credentialing 
decisions and provided such health care organizations with a means of protecting themselves 
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from such litigation by allowing the release of otherwise protected information if needed for that 
defense. In fact, this provision provides that the waiver exists "whether such claim be for 
equitable or legal relief or for intentional or unintentional tort of any kind and whether pressed 
by w, physician, emergency medical services personnel, or any other person . . . ." See id 
If the Legislature had intended that the word "use" in Idaho Code $ 39-1392c were to include 
decisions made in the course of privileging and credentialing proceedings, then the limited 
waiver of privilege for suits brought by physicians or patients found in Idaho Code 3 39-1392e(f) 
would be superfluous and meaningless. No person would have any cause of action arising from 
such decisions and the limited waiver would be unnecessary. 
In fact, SARMC cites to the case of Miller v. Saint Alphonsus, 139 Idaho 825, 87 
P.3d 934 (2004), in support of its position that the Court has already limited the scope ofjudicial 
review for a hospital's decision to deny staff privileges. Thus, the Court has recognized that a 
physician has a right to sue the hospital regarding its privileging and credentialing decisions. 
Yet, the very existence of such a cause of action is completely inconsistent with the 
interpretation of the immunity provisions of Idaho Code 9 39-1392c urged by SARMC in this 
case. Further, a review of Miller reveals that the Court did not decline to address the substance 
of SARMC's decision because of any judicial deference for privileging and credentialing 
decisions but because Idaho is an at-will employment state and nothing in SARMC's bylaws or 
the Idaho Code purported to give a physician a contract claim based upon SARMC's alleged 
failure to follow its own bylaws in making credentialing and privileging determinations. See id. 
at 833, 87 P.3d at 942. Rather, the only basis upon which the Court had to review the decision 
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was whether SARMC was in compliance with Idaho Code § 39-1395 and IDAPA 
16.03.14.200.01 .d which requires that the hospital adopt procedures for considering applications 
for privileges and that such applicants be provided due process. Thus, the Court concluded that 
the only basis for reviewing the decision was to determine if the hospital had adopted such 
procedures and had substantially complied with those procedures. See id. at 834-835,87 P.3d at 
943-944. Thus, the Court's decision in Miller is consistent with the existence of a cause of 
action based upon decisions made regarding the privileging and credentialing of physicians and 
any deference to SARMC's decision by the Court was due solely to the fact that the only basis 
for review was to ensure compliance with Idaho Code 9 39-1395. 
2. - A complele abrogation for any cause o f  action for negliaence in 
the credentialinn and urivileaina o f  physicians is not su~uorted by 
the act& lanmaze of  the statute. 
In addition to being inconsistent with other provisions of the Idaho Peer Review 
Act, the interpretation of Idaho Code § 39-1392c adopted by the District Court and urged by 
SARMC is unsupported by the literal words and very definitions within the Act when the statute 
is read as a whole. Idaho Code 9 39-1392c protects health care organizations, including 
hospitals, from "use" of "such information." The Act repeatedly refers to protected peer review 
information and defies such information as "all peer review" records which, in turn, is defined 
as "all evidence of interviews, reports, statements, minutes, memoranda, notes, investigative 
graphs and compilations and the contents thereof, and all physical materials relating to peer 
review of any health care organization." See LC. $3 39-1392b and 39-1392a(12). Thus, at best, 
the Act only protects a hospital from being sued for using "interviews, reports, statements, 
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minutes, memoranda, notes, investigative graphs and compilations and the contents thereof, and 
all physical materials relating to peer review." In this case, Mr. Harrison's suit is based upon 
information publicly available from the Idaho State Board of Medicine and, therefore, cannot be 
protected peer review information. As such, Mr. Harrison cannot be seeking to hold SARMC 
liable for using protected peer review information. If anything, Mr. Harrison is seeking to hold 
SARMC liable for not using publicly available information. 
SARMC asserts that as long as a hospital has credential procedures and conducts 
a peer review procedure, then it has done all that is required under law. Thus, SARMC admits 
that a hospital could credential a physician who does not have a license in the State of Idaho as 
long as the applicant submitted the application and it was reviewed by the credentialing 
committee. Such action would then immunize a hospital from any claim by the patient if the 
physician later committed malpractice, despite the fact that the physician would never have been 
in the position to commit such harm had the hospital not been negligent. Such injustice is 
particularly clear when the physician is assigned by SARMC in an emergency room situation or 
as the on-call physician in a particular circumstance. In such a case, the patient is relying on 
SARMC to have made certain that the physician was capable and qualified to practice medicine 
and has no opportunity to do any such research himself. Yet, despite the absolute reliance and 
clear risk of harm if SARMC has acted negligently, SARMC has no fear of any such liability. 
Rather, any hospital could decide that the financial gain from additional physicians was worth 
any such risk to the patient. 
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Such a result is in direct contradiction to the express purposes of the Idaho Peer 
Review Act, is unsupported by the plain language of the Act, and would only serve to harm the 
public. SARMC cites to the Colorado case of Kauntz v. HCA-Healthone LLC, 174 P.3d 813 
(Col. App. 2007), as support for its position that eliminating all negligent credentialing claims 
actually supports public policy. In Kauntz, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the Colorado 
statute did provide immunity from civil damages for claims brought by patients for negligent 
credentialing in some, but not all, circumstances. However, upon review of the Kauntz case, it 
actually supports Mr. Harrison's position in this matter. 
First, Kauntz demonstrates that Colorado's peer review statute expressly provides 
for immunity for decisions by the professional review body. Secondly, Kauntz expressly 
recognized that not all negligent credentialing claims were barred. In fact, Kauntz held that the 
immunity provided by the statute was available only if the professional review action was taken 
"in the reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance of health care, after reasonable efforts 
to obtain the facts of the matter, [after adequate notice to the physician], and in the reasonable 
belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain 
facts . . . ." See id. at 819. Thus, the Kauntz court concluded that not all negligent credentialing 
claims were abrogated and that if peer review action was not taken in accordance with those 
standards, a claim would still lie. See id. The fact that a cause of action would still exist under 
those circumstances allowed the Colorado court to determine that the statute did not lead to 
unjust or absurd results. See id. Thus, Kauntz recognizes that hospitals are not free to credential 
and privilege physicians with no regard for the reasonableness of such decisions. 
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In this case, Mr. Harrison has relied upon publicly available documents 
demonstrating Dr. Hartford's long history with drug and alcohol abuse and has asserted that 
SARMC either did not take reasonable efforts to investigate Dr. Hartford's history or that it 
could not have acted in reasonable belief that credentialing Dr. Hartford was appropriate after 
reviewing his history. As such, even under Colorado's statute, SARMC is not immune from a 
claim for negligence in the credentialing and privileging of a physician. 
3. - The complete abroaation o f  anv cause of  action for nealiaence in 
the credentialing and urivileaina of  uhvsicians is in direct 
contradiction with the ouruoses behind ihe Idaho Peer Review Act 
and with other urovisions ofthe Act. 
Finally, SARMC asserts that the issue in this case is not the existence of duty, but 
the existence of immunity and that it must be decided under the unique provisions of the Idaho 
Peer Review Act. Harrison does not disagree with this basic proposition, but affirmatively 
asserts that the question of immunity can only be decided by reviewing the act as a whole and in 
light of the general rule that the Court's primary function is to determine and give effect to 
legislative inteat. Where, as here, the interpretation urged by SARMC and adopted by the 
district court does not serve the purposes of the Idaho Peer Review Act, the interpretation cannot 
stand. The clear statement of policy from the Legislature regarding the enactment of the Idaho 
Peer Review Act was to reduce the morbidity and mortality rates and enforce and im~rove 
standards of medical practice in the State of Idaho. See I.C. 5 39-1392. In order to encourage 
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those purposes, the Legislature mandated that certain records of peer review committees remain 
confidential and privileged in order to allow the free exchange of ideas and opinions within and 
between health care organizations. Thus, peer review committees (including credentialing 
committees) are free to discuss particular decisions and actions taken by physicians, create 
studies and statistics to track events, and otherwise have free and open discussions in order to 
frankly and honestly assess the standards of health care in the facility without fear that such 
documents or discussions will later be used as evidence in a lawsuit against a physician or a 
hospital. That is the policy protected by the Idaho Peer Review Act. 
Nothing about the policy of improving the standards of medical care is Whered 
by providing absolute immunity for negligent credentialing claims. In fact, such immunity 
would only provide incentive to a hospital to be less than diligent in its credentialing activities. 
The express provisions of the Idaho Peer Review act regarding the privileged nature of 
discussions and documents occurring within peer review proceedings amply protect such 
information and promote the purposes of encouraging iiank and honest discussions within those 
proceedings. These discussions, in turn, should provide a hospital with the best information 
upon which to base their credentialing decision. 
In addition, the immunity is  directly contradictory with other language within the 
statute as was discussed earlier. The Court cannot presume the Legislature intended to abrogate 
an entire cause of action when such a result would render another portion of the statute 
completely meaningless. Why would the Legislature grant a limited waiver of the privilege to 
allow a hospital to defend against a claim that it has intentionally and expressly abrogated? Such 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 10 
a result is absurd and, therefore, cannot be upheld by this Court. This further demonstrates that 
had the legislature intended to fully abrogate any cause of action for negligence in the 
credentialing and privileging of physicians, it would have expressly included such a provision. 
Therefore, when the question of immunity is decided in light of the specific language used in 
Idaho's Peer Review Act, it is evidence that SARMC is not entitled to absolute immunity for 
negligent credentialing claims and that the District Court's decision must be reversed and the 
case remanded for furlher proceedings in this matter.3 
B. The District Court Erred in Granting the Motion for Protective Order 
Related to the Subpoena for the Exhibits to the Disciplinary Proceeding 
Before the Idaho Board of Medicine. 
SARMC has requested that the Court not address Mr. Harrison's claim that the 
District Court erred in granting a protective order prohibiting the discovery of the exhibits 
admitted to the disciplinary proceeding against Dr. Hartford before the Board of Medicine. 
While Mr. Harrison acknowledges that the specific dispute in the District Court was between Dr. 
Hartford and Mr. Harrison, the information requested is directly relevant to Mr. Harrison's 
claims against SARMC relating to the credentialing and privileging of Dr. Hartford. The District 
Court decided the issue as a matter of law and Mr. Harrison respectfully submits that there is no 
reason why this Court cannot address this issue at this time. As such, and for the reasons set 
SARMC argued in its brief that the Court should not consider Mr. Hamson's argument that the statute is 
ambiguous as to the extent of immunity provided because that argument was not raised below and counsel asserted 
at the bearing on the motion that the statute unambiguously did not grant complete immunity. Mr. Harrison 
respectfully asserts that the arguments raised witbin Mr. Hamson's brief regarding the interpretation of the statute, 
including the citation to the legislative history ofthe statute was submitted below. See Tr., pp. 62 - 73. 
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forth within Mr. Harrison's opening brief, Mr. Harrison respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the District Court's order denying discovery of those materials. 
C. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary .Judgment to Dr. 
Binnion on the Issue of Causation. 
1. - Expert testimonv is not required to establish causation. 
Dr. Binnion first argues that expert medical testimony is required to establish 
causation in this case. As was discussed in detail in Mr. Harrison's opening brief and will be 
discussed fkther below, Mr. Harrison has provided expert medical testimony on causation. 
However, under the facts of this case and existing Idaho case law, Mr. Harrison is not required to 
produce such expert testimony. 
In support of her argument, Dr. Binnion cites to Swallow v. Emergency Medicine 
ofldaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68 (2003), which expressly stated that whether expert 
testimony was required to demonstrate causation was dependent on the particular facts of the 
case. In Swallow, the Court held that the jury could not reasonably infer that the patient's heart 
attack was caused by an improperly prescribed dose of an antibiotic because there was no expert 
testimony establishing that a large dose of the antibiotic could cause a heart attack. See id. at 
598, 67 P.3d at 77. Certainly, the question of whether an overdose of a drug causes a specific 
physical response is a question of medical knowledge beyond the understanding of the ordinary 
juror. 
However, that is not the case with which the Court is faced at this time. In this 
case, there is undisputed medical testimony from Mr. Harrison's expert, Dr. Laureno, that the 
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sole cause of Mr. Harrison's CPM was the rapid rise in Mr. Iiarrison's serum sodium levels. See 
R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 30 (Affidavit of Erica S. Phillips in Opposition to Defendant D. Lee 
Binnion, M.D.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment), Exhibit A (Deposition of Robert 
Laureno, M.D.), p. 46, line 6 - p. 49, line 4, and Paragraph 1 of Exhibit 3 to the deposition. In 
fact, Dr. Laureno testified that there was no other cause of the CPM than the rapid elevation of 
the sodium level in Mr. Harrison's case. See id at p. 50, LL 9-18. That is the medical causation 
for his condition. The question of causation as it relates to Dr. Binnion is whether her actions 
were a substantial factor in causing that rapid rise in serum sodium which resulted in the CPM. 
Thus, this case is substantially similar to the case in Sheridan v. St. Luke's 
Regional Medical Center, 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001). In Sheridan, the Court held that 
expert medical testimony was not necessary where there was a clear chain of events linking the 
nurses' negligence to the child's untreated jaundice and his development of cerebral palsy. See 
id. at 785-786, 25 P.3d at 98-99. In Sheridan, the chain of events included the fact that the 
jaundice was present within 24 hours of the child's birth, that the nurses failed to notify the 
doctor or chart the progress of the jaundice, and sent the family home without any information 
regarding the fact that the child's jaundice was abnormal. Based on these facts, the Court 
concluded that the jury could reasonably infer that the nurses' failure to properly treat the 
jaundice resulted in the child's later diagnosis of hyperbiliritubinaemia which, in turn, led to 
cerebral palsy. Although it is unclear from the Court's opinion, it appears that expert testimony 
was presented to the jury regarding the causation link between the hyperbiliritubinaemia and the 
resulting cerebral palsy. See id 
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Here, Mr. Harrison has alleged by expert testimony that Dr. Binnion breached the 
local standard of care by failing to slow the rate of sodium replacement when she first received 
the report that Mr. Harrison's serum sodium was at 96 mEq/L; that Dr. Binnion breached the 
local standard of care by failing to properly chart her concerns about a rapid elevation of the 
sodium in a manner which would have alerted the nursing staff that Dr. Hartford needed to be 
immediately notified of the next sodium value to allow him to make any necessary adjustments 
in the sodium replacement rate; and that Dr. Binnion breached the local of standard of care by 
failing to ensure that Mr. Iiarrison was admitted to the ICU where he could have more frequent 
blood draws to more closely monitor the sodium levels. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, 
Exhibit A, p. 49, line 13 - p. 50, line 19; 88, LL 2-16. Like the nurses' actions in Sheridan, Dr. 
Binnion's actions are not of the type that requires medical expertise to establish causation. 
Rather, they present a clear chain of events from which the jury could reasonably determine that, 
but for her breaches of the local standard of care, Mr. Harrison's serum sodium levels would 
have been more closely monitored and would not have risen at a rate in excess of the local 
standard of care. Therefore, the jury can determine that Dr. Binnion's actions were a substantial 
factor in causing the rapid elevation in Mr. Harrison's serum sodium levels and, in turn, the 
cause of his CPM. 
2. - Dr. Binnion's actions were a substantial factor in causinn Mr. 
Harrison S injuries. 
The District Court concluded that Mr. Harrison had failed to establish causation 
because there was no expert testimony that, had the sodium replacement been slowed at 6:00 
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a.m., Mr. Harrison still would have suffered from CPM. Dr. Binnion asserts that because there is 
no expert testimony establishing that the CPM was inevitable based upon her actions, there can 
he no causation and she is entitled to summary judgment. Mr. Harrison does not dispute that his 
experts could not state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the rise in serum 
sodium levels from 96 mEqlL to 105 mEq/L between 12:27am and 6:OOam was, in and of itself, 
a significant enough rise to cause the CPM. 
Dr. Binnion asserts that Harrison misrepresented Dr. Laureno's testimony in his 
opening brief. However, a review of Dr. Laureno's testimony indicates he testified that he could 
not state with any certainty that the change in the sodium level between 12:27am and 6:OOam 
would have, in and of itself, been sufficient to cause the CPM. This is exactly what Mr. Harrison 
has represented Dr. Laureno's testimony to be. Dr. Binnion appears to argue that because Mr. 
Harrison referenced slowing or stopping the sodium replacement at 6:OOam when that was not 
specifically part of the question to Dr. Laureno, that Mr. Harrison has made a misrepresentation 
to the Court. However, Dr. Laureno specifically testified that he could not say with certainty that 
"this change" (the one between 12:27am and 6:OOam) without any "subsequent change" would 
have resulted in CPM. The reference to subsequent change is clearly a reference to a subsequent 
change in the serum sodium levels. Therefore, Dr. Laureno is testifying that the 9 mEqL rise in 
the serum sodium level may not have caused CPM had there been no further change in that level 
(i.e. had the sodium replacement rate considerably slowed or stopped). It is unclear how this 
dispute about Dr. Laureno's testimony is relevant to this appeal as Mr. Harrison has not disputed 
Dr. Laweno's conclusion that his CPM was not solely attributable to the rise in sodium that 
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occurred between 12:27am and 6:00am, but there was no misrepresentation to the Court on this 
issue. 
The real issue for this Court is whether the District Court erred in determining that 
Dr. Binnion was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of causation because no expert could 
testify with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the rise in the sodium &om 12:27am to 
6:OOam was suff~cient, by itself, to cause Mr. Harrison's CPM. 
Dr. Binnion asserts that because Dr. Laureno testified that Mr. Harrison's CPM 
was caused solely by the rapid rise in sodium, the "but for" test must be applied to this case. 
However this position, again, ignores the very holding by the Idaho Supreme Court in Newberry 
V. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d 187 (2005). In Newberry, there was but one cause of the 
loss of the plaintiffs eye - a bacterial infection that began at the time of the initial injury. In this 
case, there is but one cause of Mr. Harrison's CPM - the rapid elevation in his sodium levels. 
However, in Newberry, the Court rejected the "but for" causation test stating that where more 
than one cause is asserted, the substantial factor test is appropriate. See id. at 288, 127 P.3d at 
191. In so holding, the Court rejected the doctor's argument that the "but for" test was 
appropriate because there was only one cause of the injury to the plaintiff, namely the bacterial 
infection. The Court held that the doctor's argument ignored the fact that there was evidence 
presented that the doctor's negligence contributed to the injury. See id at 289, 127 P.3d at 192. 
The Court also stated that the doctor was free to argue to the jury that he was not negligent or 
that his negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs damages, but because 
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there was evidence that the negligence was a possible contributing cause, the substantial factor 
test was appropriate. See id. 
Dr. Binnion asserts that the breaches of the local standard of care identified by Dr. 
Navar are not factors in causation at all because they all point to the single cause of the CPM, the 
rapid rise in sodium s e w .  Dr. Binnion's position is untenable in light of the Newberry 
decision. Mr. Harrison has provided several different factors which contributed to the rapid rise 
in sodium which, including Dr. Binnion's negligence, Dr. Hartford's negligence, and negligence 
by the hospital. In turn, the rapid elevation in Mr. Harrison's sodium levels which was caused by 
the combination of each of these factors, was the sole cause of his CPM. Mr. Harrison's experts 
have testified that Dr. Binnion's breaches of the local standard of care were factors which 
substantially contributed to the rapid rise in sodium levels which, in turn, caused Mr. Harrison's 
CPM. Like the doctor in Newberry, Dr. Binnion is free to argue to the jury that she was not 
negligent or that her negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the injuries to Mr. 
Harrison. But, where, as here, evidence has been presented that Dr. Binnion's actions were a 
contributing cause to the harm suffered by Mr. Harrison, summary judgment is not appropriate 
just because Dr. Binnion's action may not have been the sole cause of Mr. Harrison's damages. 
In fact, the Court rejected this exact argument in Newberry. In that case, the 
defendant argued that the jury instruction on the "substantial factor" test precluded the doctor 
from arguing that even if the doctor had done everything properly, the infection would have still 
resulted in the plaintiff losing the eye. The Court expressly stated that nothing prevented the 
doctor from asserting that ihe plaintiff would have lost his eye regardless of the doctor's actions. 
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See id at 289, 127 P.3d at 192. Similarly, nothing prevents Dr. Binnion from presenting her 
factual assertion that regardless of what she did or did not do, the CPM would have occurred 
anyway. Therefore, because Mr. Harrison has provided multiple causative factors for the rapid 
rise in his sodium and, consequentially, his CPM, the substantial factor test is the appropriate test 
in this case. 
Finally, Dr. Binnion asserts that even if the substantial factor test should be 
applied, summary judgment is appropriate in this case because Mr. Harrison's experts did not 
establish that Dr. Binnion was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's injury. In support of 
this position, Dr. Binnion relies upon Dr. Navar's testimony that he did not know if Dr. 
Binnion's actions were enough to cause CPM in Mr. Harrison. However, a review of the 
testimony cited by Dr. Binnion in support of this assertion reveals that it is the same testimony 
relied upon earlier - namely that Dr. Navar could not state with certainty that Mr. Harrison's 
CPM would have occurred if the sodium replacement rate had changed substantially or stopped 
at 6:OOam. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Ex. A, p. 106, LL 3-20. Once again, however, the 
reliance on this testimony ignores the fact that Mr. Harrison has asserted that a substantial factor 
in the failure to slow or stop the sodium at 6:OOam was that Dr. Binnion failed lo communicate 
within her physician's orders, at the time they were written, her concerns about the rapid 
elevation of sodium and that all laboratory values be immediately communicated to the attendmg 
physician upon receipt by attending nursing staff. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 20, Exhibit A, 
p. 49, line 13 - p. 50, line 19. 
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Dr. Binnion's argument further ignores that Dr. Navar also testified that Dr. 
Binnion breached the local standard of care by failing to ensure that Mr. Harrison was admitted 
to the ICU unit. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Exhibit A, p. 49, line 13 - p. 50, line 19. Dr. 
Navar testified that Mr. Harrison should have been in the ICU unit where he could have more 
frequent blood draws to more closely monitor his sodium levels to ensure that the levels were not 
rising at a rate more than .5 milliequivalents per hour. See id. at p. 88, LL 2-16. Additionally, 
Dr. James Souza, a physician who is board certified in pulmonary and critical care and who 
worked in the SARMC intensive care unit as an intensivist in November of 2003, testified that 
the standard of care for raising the sodium level of a severely hyponatrernic patient such as Ray 
Harrison in Boise, Idaho, in November of 2003 was no more than .5 milliequivalents per hour, 
not to exceed 10 milliequivalents per day. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 30, Exhibit C 
(Deposition of James Souza, M.D.), p. 19, line 12 - p. 21, line 21. Thus, the testimony above 
establishes that Dr. Binnion's breaches of the local standard of care were substantial factors in 
causing Mr. Harrison's injuries because, had those breaches not occurred, more likely than not, 
Mr. Harrison would have been closely monitored and the rate of correction would not have 
exceeded .5 milliequivalents per hour. 
3. - Dr. Nmar 's opinions are not speculative. 
Finally, Dr. Binnion asserts that Dr. Navar's opinions regard'mg Dr. Binnion's 
failure to properly communicate her concerns about rapid sodium elevation in her physician's 
orders and her failure to ensure Mr. Hartford was admitted to the ICU are speculative because 
they depend on the underlying theory that had those communications been made and/or Mr. 
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Harrison been admitted to the ICU, the rate of replacement would have been slowed and CPM 
would not have developed. However, this argument ignores the fact that it is impossible to know 
with absolute certainty what would have happened had a different decision been made or a 
different action taken. So, no expert can testify with absolute certainty that the proper 
subsequent steps would have been taken if the correct action had been taken by the defendant 
doctor. For example, if a plaintiff asserts that a doctor's failure to diagnose a tumor as cancer 
has caused substantial damage, no expert can testify with absolute certainty that had the tumor 
been diagnosed properly, all caretakers coming in after that point would have performed their 
jobs according to the applicable standards of care. Nonetheless, experts must rely on the 
assumption that such care would have been given in forming opinions about causation. 
This case is no different. There is no reason to believe that had Dr. Binnion 
properly communicated the concerns about the rapid elevation in sodium to the nursing staff and 
instructed that Dr. Hartford be immediately notified of the sodium value at 6:00am, the nurses 
would not have checked the sodium values, recognized the rapid rise, and contacted Dr. Hartford 
with that information. Thus, Dr. Hartford would have had that information and Dr. Binnion's 
concerns at a time when the rate of elevation could have been slowed or stopped. Further, there 
is no reason to believe that had Dr. Binnion insisted upon Mr. Harrison's admission to the ICU, 
that the staff in the ICU would not have complied with the local standard of care as identified by 
Dr. Souza and closely monitored Mr. Harrison to ensure that the sodium rate did not exceed that 
standard of care. As such, Dr. Navar's opinions are not speculative in a manner which renders 
them inadmissible. 
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Additionally, Dr. Binnion's assertions that she did communicate her concerns in 
the chart and discussed them with Dr. Hartford are factual issues which are inappropriate for 
summary judgment. Mr. Harrison has presented evidence that Dr. Binnion's concerns were not 
listed in her physician's orders that were available to the floor nurses after Mr. Harrison's 
admission to the hospital. The fact that her concerns were charted in the ER record has no 
bearing because she did not carry that concern through in the physician's orders. Further, Dr. 
Binnion's assertion that she spoke with Dr. Hartford before Mr. Harrison's admission is 
irrelevant to this appeal because Dr. Navar testified that, in his opinion, Dr. Binnion did not 
properly communicate the severity of Mr. Harrison's hyponatremia and failed to convey the 
severity of his overall condition. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Exhibit A, p. 88, line 25 - p. 
89, line 10. Thus, at best, there is an issue of fact regarding whether Dr. Binnion's conduct was 
in conformance with the local standard of care. 
Further, although Dr. Navar acknowledges that Dr. Binnion did not have 
admitting privileges and could not admit Mr. Harrison to the ICU, he expressly testified that it 
was his experience that when there is a conflict between the ER physician and the admitting 
physician regarding which floor the patient should be admitted to, the ER physician who is 
present and has evaluated the patient is the one who should make the final determination. See R. 
Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Exhibit A, p. 93, line 24 - p. 94, line 10. Dr. Navar further testified 
that if Dr. Hartford had refused to admit Mr. Harrison to the ICU, Dr. Binnion should have asked 
Dr. Hartford to come to the hospital and see Mr. Harrison in the ER. See R. Vol. 11, p. 327, 
Exhibit 25, Exhibit A, p. 99, LL 1-7. Thus, contrary to Dr. Binnion's assertions, Mr. Harrison 
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has presented expert testimony that she did bear responsibility for seeing Mr. Harrison placed in 
the ICU and failed in that responsibility. 
Therefore, based on the arguments presented above, Mr. Harrison respectfully 
requests that the Court reverse the District Court's decision granting summary judgment to Dr. 
Binnion on the issue of causation and find that Mr. Harrison has submitted suffcient evidence to 
establish a material issue of fact regarding whether Dr. Binnion's breaches of the local standard 
of care were a substantial factor in causing the rapid elevation in sodium which, in turn, caused 
Mr. Harrison's CPM and remand this case for trial. 
D. Dr. Binnion i.v not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Dr. Binnion has also asserted that she is entitled to attorney fees on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code $ 12-121. The Court has repeatedly held that such fees are to be 
awarded only if the Court "is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation." See, e.g., Rowley v. Fuhrman, 135 Idaho 
105, 110, 982 P.2d 940 (1999). Dr. Binnion asserts that fees are appropriate because Mr. 
Harrison has simply asked the Court to second guess the District Court's decision granting 
summary judgment to Dr. Binnion. 
Mr. Harrison strongly asserts that fees are inappropriate in this matter. First, Mr. 
Harrison asserts that fees are inappropriate because Dr. Binnion will not be the prevailing party 
on this appeal. Secondly, as is set forth above, Mr. Harrison has submitted evidence and 
argument in support of his position that the District Court misapplied the law in this matter. Mr. 
Hamson has asserted that the District Court's decision is inconsistent with prior case law from 
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this Court and has made good faith arguments in support of this issue. To adopt Dr. Binnion's 
argument would be change the standard of Idaho Code 5 12-121 from a frivolous standard to one 
where a party is entitled to fees upon appeal of a summary judgment decision whenever that 
party prevails on appeal. Any appeal of a s w a y  judgment decision asks the Court to second 
guess the district court's legal determinations. It is certainly not the intent of Idaho Code 5 12- 
121, nor consistent with the Court's interpretation of that statute, to award fees when a party 
brings a good faith appeal supported by evidentiary and legal arguments demonstrated why the 
District Court erred. See, e.g., Tolley v. Thi Company, 140 Idaho 253, 262-263, 92 P.3d 503, 
512-513 (2004) (upholding the district court's decision not to award fees under Idaho Code 5 12- 
121 and declining to award fees on appeal under that statute where the party's legal argument 
may have been incorrect but was not plainly fallacious). As such, Dr. Binnion's request for fees 
should be denied. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the District Court's decision denying the Motion for Leave to Amend regarding the claim 
of negligent credentialing against SARMC; reverse the District Court's decision granting the 
Protective Order as to the Board of Medicine exhibits; and reverse the District Court's grant of 
sununary judgment to Dr. Binnion on the issue of causation. 
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